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NOTES
Finally, of course, the Legislature could just sit tight and hope
that the problems will work out themselves. Legislative inaction in
reference to this matter during the past twenty years leads one to won-
der whether the reason is indifference or whether opposing interests
have created an impasse from which neither side will yield.8 2 It is
possible, too, that the Indiana Supreme Court may reconsider the matter
policy-wise and relax its somewhat technical and legalistic attitude should
another case arise. Meanwhile, though, no one can be absolutely certain
what the ultimate extension of the principal cases will be or what action
can be taken by taxpayers in reliance upon the potential development of
the doctrine of constructive receipts.
FELA VENUE ABUSE: NECESSITY FOR
CONGRESSIONAL AMENDMENT
Recurring discussion in the cases, law reviews, and professional
journals concerns the propriety of the Federal Employers Liability Act,
as a means'of redressing injuries sustained by railway workers through
the negligence of a railroad or its agents.2 Not the least of the grounds
for criticism of FELA is the breadth of the workman's choice of venue 3
and the consequent tendency to use it to harass the defendant railroad. 4
revenue." The Commission studied other types of taxes. Id. at 154, for an appraisal
of retail sales, net income, and net worth taxes for Indiana.
"I think that the gross income tax was intended to be an emergency measure
with a short life. But since it proved to be a fountain of finance exceeding the most
fantastic expectations the politicians began to magnify its 'good' points and defend it.
It is a revenue-raiser deluxe. . . ." Communication to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
from the General Counsel, Indiana Department of State Revenue.
82. It is significant that no remedial legislation was introduced or adopted dur-
ing the 1953 Session of the Indiana General Assembly, particularly since the Colpaert
and Crown Development decisions had been reported but a few days prior to the
opening of the Legislature and should have been fresh in the minds of those present.
1. 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. (1946). Hereinafter referred to
as FELA.
2. The most recent analysis of FELA as a method of redressing railroad employee
injuries is Parker, FELA or Uniform Compensation for All Workers?7, 18 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 208 (1953).
3. 36 STAT. 291 (1910), 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1946), as amended, 62 STAT. 989 (1948),
45 U.S.C. § 56 (Supp. 1952). "Under this chapter an action may be brought in a
district court of the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant,
or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing busi-
ness at the time of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of the courts of the
United States under this chapter shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the
several States."
"A civil action in any State court against a railroad or its receivers or trustees,
arising under sections 51-60 of Title 45, may not be removed to any district court of
the United States." 28 U.S.C. 1445(a) (Supp. 1950).
4. The broad venue enables the employee to bring suit a large distance from
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Ineffective judicial attempts to prevent vexatious suits have lent force
to this argument 5 and have also provoked discussion concerning amend-
where the cause of action arose. In general, the railroads claim that such distant
suits present a great inconvenience and expense in defending and are brought to
harass and vex the railroad. The emphasized factors of inconvenience and expense
are the cost of transporting, and maintaining, witnesses to the distant court; the lack
of compulsory process to obtain the attendance of witnesses; prejudice through
failure to have the actual presence of witnesses; the cost of obtaining depositions;
the inability to view the scene of the accident when appropriate; and the damage
to business due to the absence of employee witnesses. Miles v. Illinois Central R.R.,
315 U.S. 698 (1942); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941); Cleve-
land, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Shelly, 96 Ind. App. 273, 170 N.E. 328 (1930); Reed's
Adm'x v. Illinois Central R.R., 182 Ky. 455, 206 S.W. 794 (1918); Boston & M. R.R.
v. Whitehead, 307 Mass. 106, 29 N.E.2d 916 (1940); New York, C. & St. L. R.R.
v. Matzinger, 136 Ohio St. 271, 25 N.E.2d 349 (1940) (not FELA suit); Union
Pacific R.R. v. Utterback, 173 Oregon 572, 146 P.2d 769 (1944), cert. denied,
323 U.S. 710, 711 (1944); Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. McGinley, 175 Wis. 565, 185
N.W. 218 (1921). The allegation was sometimes made that these factors caused an
unreasonable burden on interstate commerce. But such a claim has been generally
discredited. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 50, 51 (1941) ; Jablonski v.
Southern Pacific Co., 76 F. Supp. 1022, 1023 (S.D. N.Y. 1948).
For an excellent discussion of the extent of FELA venue abuse including some
dramatic statistics see Winters, Interstate Commerce in Damage Suits, 29 J. AM.
Jun. Soc'y 135 (1946). In Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Andrews, 338 Ill. App. 552.
88 N.E.2d 364 (1949), an attorney was enjoined from continuance of a solicitation
organization located in Chicago under which he was litigating there ninety-two FELA
actions with claims of approximately five million dollars. See General Orders No.
18 and 18a of the Director General of Railroads issued in 1918 to limit venue in
tort actions against railroads to prevent "remote" suits which seriously interfere with
the physical operation of the railroads. The Orders are set out in a footnote to a
sustaining decision in Alabama & Vicksburg Ry. v. Journey, 257 U.S. 111 (1921).
The query of why a distant suit is brought hundreds of miles from the scene
of the azcident or the employee's residence may be answered by realistic considera-
tions. When an employee is injured it is inconceivable that a distant court is sought
for substantive-procedural advantages. Reed's Adm'x v. Illinois Central R.R., 182
Ky. 455, 206 S.W. 794 (1918) (the court assumes that one court would do justice
and give a fair trial as well as another). On the other hand, it is very conceivable
that a claimant and his attorney are aware that awards of metropolitan juries are
higher than those of rural juries, see Winters, supra, at 136, or that there is a greater
bargaining power for the client if the distant suit will be of such a great expense
to the defendant that it is to the railroad's interest to settle, even for an amount
greater than the actual injury suffered. "When the chasers solicited cases . . . they
pointed out to the injured employees that it would be difficult and expensive for the
railroads to bring . . . witnesses to Chicago for the trial and that therefore the rail-
road companies were more likely to make settlements, and that . . . in Chicago larger
verdicts could be obtained there than in the states where the accidents occurred."
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Andrews, 338 Ill. App. 552, 566, 88 N.E.2d 364, 370, 371
(1949). See Reed's Adm'x v. Illinois Central R.R., supra, at 468, 469, 206 S.W.
at 800; Chicago, M., St. P. & P. Ry. v. Wolf, 199 Wis. 278, 226 N.W. 297 (1929)
(a well organized solicitation business was described).
5. Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 73 Sup. Ct. 749 (1953) ; Mo. ex rel.
So. Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950); Miles v. Illinois Central R.R., 315 U.S. 698
(1942); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941).
One judicial remedy for the vexatious suit is a restraining order against prosecu-
tion of the distant suit issued by the court having jurisdiction over the employee.
See Note, When Courts of Equity Will Enjoin Foreign Suits, 27 IOWA L. REv. 76
(1941); Helsell, Injunctive Relief Against Oppressive Suits in Foreign Jurisdictions,
12 F.R.D. 502 (1952); McCLINTOCK, EQuITY 462 (2d ed. 1948). The innumerable
NOTES
ment to the FELA venue section. Review of past decisions sheds some
light on the direction future action may take.
Chronologically, the present ineffectiveness of equitable methods
for preventing vexatious litigation derives from Miles v. Ill. Cent. R.R.,6
decided in 1942. The Supreme Court struck down an attempt by a
Tennessee state court to enjoin prosecution of an FELA suit in a Mis-
souri court; dicta in Mr. Justice Reed's majority opinion created later
confusion by declaring that the Missouri court must hear the suit as
presented originally. 7 That same year a similar attempt by a state court
fact situations arising make it difficult to formulate precisely what elements consti-
tute a vexatious or harassing suit. Ex parte Crandall, 53 F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1931),
cert. denied, 285 U.S. 540 (1932) (petition denied for habeas corpus by imprisoned
employee for violation of state court decree enjoining prosecution of FELA action
in another state court); Alspaugh v. N. Y., S. & St. L. R.R., 98 Ind. App. 280, 188
N.E. 869 (1934); Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Shelly, 96 Ind. App. 273, 170
N.E. 328 (1930); Bankers' Life Co. v. Loring, 217 Iowa 534, 250 N.W. 8 (1933)
(intent to coerce a settlement is sufficient grounds to enjoin distant suit; not FELA
case) ; Reed's Adm'x v. Illinois Central R.M, 182 Ky. 455, 206 S.W. 794 (1918)
(leading case on state court enjoining FELA action in a distant state court) ; Missouri
Pacific Ry. v. Harden, 158 La. 889, 105 So. 2 (1925) (difference between procedure
and practice is not sufficient to enjoin); Boston & M. MR. v. Whitehead, 307 Mass.
106, 108, 29 N.E.2d 916, 917, 918 (1940) (hope for a larger verdict is not alone
harassing); Southern Pacific Co. v. Baum, 39 N.M. 22, 38 P.2d 1106 (1934) (mere
inconvenience is not grounds for an injunction); Louisville & N. RR. v. Ragan,
172 Tenn. 593, 113 S.W.2d 743 (1938); see also 56 YALE L. J. 1234, 1236 (1947).
The other judicial remedy for the harassing suit is dismissal by the initial court
trying the cause under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The doctrine has been
classically stated as "the discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise a
possessed jurisdiction whenever it appears that the cause before it may be more
appropriately tried elsewhere." Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in
Anglo-American Law, 29 CoL. L. REv. 1 (1929). Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum
Non Conveniens, 35 CALIF. L. Rnv. 380 (1947). The cases indicate no distinction
in the allegations and considerations for ruling on forum iwn conveniens or in grant-
ing an injunction. The better view, instead of a mechanical formula for forum non
conveniens or a restraining order, would be to balance the advantages and disadvan-
tages of the distant suit to the litigants and require a clear showing of real injury
which approaches evidence of intent by the plaintiff employee to defraud, harass,
and vex the defendant. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Baum, 39 N.M. 22, 38 P.2d
1106 (1934). In denying the railroad an injunction that court said something more
substantial than a mere showing of inconvenience and expense was required. The
implication is that such a showing of hardship is needed as to draw an inference
of iftent to secure some inequitable advantage by the employee. In this case the
employee presented a good faith purpose in his venue choice; the court appears to
grasp the correlation between the function of the courts and the purpose of FELA
venue. Although a justification of choice of venue is presumed and should not be
required in the first instance, it should be required to rebut a clear showing by the
railroad of hardship and harassment in the venue selected.
Since 1404(a), infra note 9, the federal courts are adequately equipped to pre-
vent FELA venue abuse. Therefore, the scope of this note will be restricted to FELA
venue in the state courts.
6. 315 U.S. 698 (1942).
7. "The Missouri courts here involved must permit this litigation." Supra note
6, at 704. The Court continues: "To deny citizens from other states, suitors under
F.E.L.A., access to its [Missouri] courts would, if it permitted access to its own
citizens, violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause." Ibid. These statements could
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to enjoin litigation in a federal court was invalidated in B. & 0. R.R.
v. Kepner.8 Since the vexatious suit could not be foreclosed in a federal
court by injunction, Congress, in 1948, enacted Section 1404(a) of
the Judicial Code to empower the federal district courts to transfer
any civil action in the interest of justice and for the convenience of
the parties;9 thus, the equitable power of forum non conveniens was
statutorily conferred upon federal courts. It now became of immediate
interest whether state courts would also be permitted, in view of the
equitable policy of 1404(a) and of the Miles dicta, to utilize the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens to dismiss inconvenient suits.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Missouri v. Mayfield' ° expressly stated
that state courts could adopt or reject the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens according to their own procedural rules or policy. Neither the
Miles case nor federal law prevented the state forum from dismissing
an FELA suit if such was the operation of local law with regard to
other actions. Nothing prior to 1404(a) purported to force states to
entertain FELA actions.11 Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring, expressed
the more reasonable conclusion that 1404(a) evidences congressional
be interpreted as stating an unquestionable fact as regards Missouri practice and not
a general dicta holding that FELA venue is compulsory on state courts, for Mis-
souri courts had interpreted their statute law as compelling jurisdiction over all
transitory actions, see Bright v. Wheelock, 323 Mo. 840, 873, 20 S.W.2d 684, 699
(1929) ; thus to refuse this present suit by a citizen of another state would have been
a violation of the "privileges and immunities" clause. The dicta when taken in con-
text with the opinion, including a statement that the power of Missouri to regulate
its courts was not an issue, should have precluded any reliance upon it.
However, the dicta was relied upon. The Miles case was held to be "completely
decisive" that a state court must hear an FELA action. Leet v. Union Pacific R.R.,
25 Cal.2d 605, 155 P.2d 42 (1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 866 (1945). See also Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 505 (1947).
8. 314 U.S. 44 (1941).
9. 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) (Supp. 1950). "For the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought." See Harris, Survey of the
Federal Judicial Code, 3 SOUTHWESTERN L. J. 229, 235 (1949); 18 J. B. A. KAN. 242
(1949). Note that this differs from common law forumo non conveniens which resulted
in dismissal of the action. However, this section is generally referred to as a statutory
enactment of the doctrine.
The FELA venue section is subject to a motion to transfer under 1404(a) in
the federal courts. Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949). The court concluded that
the broad language of 1404(a) and the evidences of congressional intent, especially
the revisor's notes, infra note 16, could lead only to the conclusion that a special venue
section as in FELA was subject to 1404(a) in federal courts.
10. 340 U.S. 1 (1950). In an FELA action in a Missouri state court, a motion
of forum non conveniens was denied. The defendant railroad instituted proceedings
in the state supreme court for a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to enter-
tain the motion; the writ was denied.
11. Mr. Justice Frankfurter apparently continued the view he held in dissenting
in the Miles case. The venue section of FELA does not remove state courts' powers
to subject it to equitable considerations whether by injunction or forum non conveniens.
NOTES
intent to subject FELA venue to equitable considerations and to remove
the compulsion of the Miles dicta on state courts. 12
Although state utilization of forum non conveniens was not
grounded upon the passage of 1404(a), the question remained un-
answered as to whether the states could, upon the theory that 1404(a)
abolished the rule of the Miles case, employ the injunction to prevent
harassing FELA suits in other jurisdictions. Since very few state courts
had, nor have, adopted forum non conveniens as local policy, the issue
was acute.13 It was against this background that, in the 1952-53 term, the
Supreme Court decided Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. 4
The respondent railroad sought an injunction in a Georgia court
to restrain a Georgia citizen from bringing his FELA suit in an Ala-
bama court. The cause of action arose in Georgia. The trial court re-
fused to grant the injunction but the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed,
holding that state courts could, after the adoption of 1404(a), enjoin
the continuance of an FELA suit in another state court. The Supreme
Court of the United States reversed, finding that the Miles case still con-
trolled. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, for the majority, construed 1404(a)
literally; it conferred forum non conveniens upon federal courts alone.
"Nor does 1404(a) contemplate the collateral attack on venue . . .; it
contains no suggestion that the venue question may be raised and set-
tled by the initiation of a second lawsuit in a court in a foreign juris-
diction. . ...15
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, broadly interpreted 1404(a)
as a declaration of congressional policy to subject FELA venue to
equitable considerations and thus to state restraining orders. 16 The Miles
decision was no longer controlling. because he thought it unreasonably
narrow to believe that Congress intended merely to prevent abuse of
12. 340 U.S. 1, 5, 6 (1950).
13. Barely half a dozen states have accepted the doctrine. Barrett, supra note 5.
at 388, 389.
14. 73 Sup. Ct. 749 (1953). The state supreme court opinion is reported in 209
Ga. 187, 71 S.E.2d 243 (1952). See 26 So. CAni. L. Rzv. 210 (1953). In Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. v. Wood, 58 So.2d 549 (Fla. 1952), the Florida Supreme Court in
a similar fact situation held that Miles still controlled despite 1404(a). The court
utilized reasoning similar to that of the majority opinion in the United States Supreme
Court.
15. 73 Sup. Ct. 749, 752 (1953).
16. 73 Sup. Ct. 749, 753-757 (1953).
See revisor's notes to 28 U.S.C.A. 1404(a) (1948). H. R. REP. 308, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1947). "Subsection (a) was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, permitting transfer to a more convenient forum, even though the
venue is proper. As an example of the need of such a provision, see Baltimore & Ohio
R.R. v. Kepner which was prosecuted under the F.E.L.A. in New York, although the
accident occurred and the employee resided in Ohio." See the Supreme Court's
interpretation of congressional intent in Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
FELA venue in federal courts while ignoring the same considerations
in state courts. Admittedly the case illustrated the effect of a literal
interpretation of 1404(a), because Alabama, where the employee ini-
tiated his action, did not recognize the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
so that the railroad's sole remedy against the alleged vexatious choice of
forum was an injunction. 17 It follows that adherence to the rule of
the Miles case creates a haven for employee suits in those state courts
which do not recognize the inconvenient forum doctrine. Moreover,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter asserts, denial of the injunctive process de-
stroys between state and federal courts and between different state courts
the uniformity of treatment generally accorded FELA litigants. Under-
lying these views appears to be the conviction that forum non conveniens
and enjoining an FELA litigant are indistinguishable as equitable powers
of state courts which in the first instance were not destroyed by the
FELA venue section: "It is beside the point to urge that 1404(a)
speaks only of forum non conveniens in federal courts and not of state
court injunctions against out of state suits."18
In recognition that the harassing suit presents a distinct problem
in FELA litigation, little assistance could be expected from the Pope
case no matter what decision was reached. Manifestly, to relegate the
railroad to the sole use of the inconvenient forum doctrine as the chief
attack upon the vexatious suit is an insignificant aid in resolving the
problem. Very few states have adopted the use of the doctrine and the
breadth of the venue section permits easy access to other states' courts.
On the other hand, the alternative decision in the Pope case, affirm-
ing the use of the injunction, is also subject to serious objection. To
impress FELA litigants of the equitable limitation upon their choice
of venue, the railroads quite conceivably might seek restraining orders
when any suit was brought in a distant court not completely satisfactory
to the railroad. An appeal in case the injunction were denied would
have rested on the belief that it should be public knowledge that the
restraining order would be used to full avail and no unsatisfactory venue
tolerated. The employee would then be burdened not only with the
expense of contesting the appeal but also with a great delay in time.
Obviously, the typical FELA litigant is financially incapable of bearing
the cost and delay of prolonged proceedings before final adjudication
of his claim on the merits. 9 As a result of this strengthening factor
17. See Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 73 Sup. Ct. 749, 756 (1953). See
Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Pope, 209 Ga. 187, _, 71 S.E.2d 243, 248 (1952).
18. 73 Sup. Ct. 749, 755 (1953).
19. Mr. Justice Jackson concurring in the Miles case, 315 U.S. 698, 705, makes
an often stated observation that: "He [the employee] is not given a remedy, but only
NOTES
in its bargaining position, the railroads would then be in a position to
coerce an unreasonable settlement. Moreover, even though an employee
may have a bona fide reason for bringing suit where the defendant is
merely doing business, though the cause of action may have arisen else-
where, the threat of a time-consuming, expensive series of legal pro-
ceedings might very possibly induce him to sue in a forum more accept-
able to the defendant. The plaintiff's election of a forum could be
effectively restricted through eliminating the effect of the "doing busi-
ness" choice, but as a consequence, the essence of the venue section 20
would be undermined.
In addition, the efficacy of the injunction is conditional. The party
enjoined could refuse to comply with the order but escape contempt
proceedings by leaving the jurisdiction of the enjoining court.2 1 Yet
a more important determinative of the injunction's ineffectiveness is
the recognition given to it by the court where the suit was initiated. No
substantial authority exists to require recognition under the full faith
and credit clause.22  The strongest argument advanced by those state
courts which refuse recognition of the decree is that recognition and
consequent dismissal of the suit would be such a denial of its courts to
citizens of other states as to constitute discrimination which violates
the privileges and immunities clause of the United States Constitution. 23
In view of Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R.R.,2 4 where dismissal
a lawsuit ... [I]n most cases he Will be unable to pursue that except by splitting
his speculative prospects with a lawyer. The functioning of this backward system
of dealing with industrial accidents . .. [results in] two dollars of judgment for
every dollar that actually reaches those who have been damaged. . . . It seems more
probable that Congress intended to give the disadvantaged workman some leverage
in the choice of venue than that it intended ... [that] the railroad could force him
to try one lawsuit at home to find out whether he would be allowed to try his prin-
cipal lawsuit elsewhere." Id. at 707, 708.
20. The Court discussed the history and purpose of the present FELA venue
section in Baltimore & Ohio R.1. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 49, 50 (1941).
21. One state court, recognizing the FELA claimant's attempt to circumvent
its injunction against the distant suit, enjoined within its jurisdiction the notary,
the claimant's attorney, and the witnesses from taking testimony and certifying to
any deposition in any manner representing the restrained party in the distant suit.
New York, C. & St. L. R.R. v. Perdiue, 97 Ind. App. 517, 187 N.E. 349 (1933).
22. MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY 477 (2d ed. 1948); STUMBEEG, CoNFLICT oF LAWS
123 (1950); Foster, Place of Trial in Civil Actions, 43 H~av. L. REV. 1217, 124'
(1930); 21 NEB. L. Rv. 160 (1942); 39 YALE L. J. 719 (1930).
23. Although there are few cases on this specific issue, the leading case appears
to be State ex rel. Bossung v. District Ct., 140 Minn. 494, 498, 168 N.W. 589, 591
(1918).
24. 279 U.S. 377 (1929). A state statute conferred discretionary power on state
courts to dismiss transitory actions. Although the opinion made no specific mention
of forum non conveniens, the case has been generally accepted as authority for state
court exercise of the doctrine. The test laid down, dismissal on basis of "residence"
does not violate the "privileges and immunities" clause, has been used by state courts
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was permitted under a statute based upon plaintiff's residence rather
than his citizenship, and the decision in the Mayfield case,25 such an
interpretation is unnecessarily restricted. For example, if a citizen of
state X sued in the courts of X but resided in state Y where the injunc-
tion issued, state X could deny use of its courts in recognition of the
injunction; since the state could refuse access to its courts in the interest
of justice to its own citizens, no discrimination would result from accord-
ing similar treatment to citizens of other states. Despite the fact that
the privileges and immunities contention is weak, the present law with
respect to recognition of foreign decrees is vague and depends upon
perennial issues of comity between the states.26
'Since permitting use of the injunction could potentially have caused
more harm than good,27 and because of nonrecognition by a majority
of state courts of the forum non. conveniens doctrine, it is manifest
that the Pope case neither furnished, nor could it have furnished, any
substantial assistance in this problem area. Although the Pope case per-
mits this obvious conclusion, it does not so patently indicate the next
step in the legal battle over abuse of FELA venue.
If the judiciary is to provide relief from inequitable use of the
venue section, clearly the inconvenient forum doctrine must provide
the means.28 In light of the states' inertia, only a more decisive position
to determine the limit of their dismissal powers in FELA cases. Perhaps more
emphasis upon dismissal in the interest of justice could have been noted. This decision
formed the basis for the unnecessary confusion after the Miles case dicta.
25. The Mayfield case enumerates grounds upon which access to a state court
may be denied. The state court opinion was ambiguous as to just what grounds the
decision was based upon. The majority of the Supreme Court deemed it necessary,
on the probability that the state court felt bound by federal case law, to enunciate
clearly the status of forum non conveniens in state courts as regards FELA. The opinion
established the grounds upon which a state could dismiss an FELA action without
involving a federal question-local procedural policy applicable to all actions includ-
ing those of nonresident citizens of the state. The constitutional test of the Douglas
case was utilized by the Court. "[N]o substantial question as to the constitutional
validity of the court's action would appear since the application of the doctrine
[forum non convemients] would depend on other factors than the mere residence or
citizenship of the parties." Barrett, supra note 5, at 393.
26. See note 22 supra.
27. Adoption of the injunctive device would also have been in conflict with the
principle of uniformity and created even more confusion as to the rights of the
litigants under FELA venue. E.g., federal courts use forum non conveniens, some
state courts use forum non conveniens, and in the remaining state courts the injunc-
tive device would have been used.
28. "The difficulty both in obtaining and enforcing the injunction makes it appear
a rather inadequate makeshift, of some use in correcting certain of the more extreme
[venue] abuses. . . . The chief significance [of restraining decrees against distant
suits] . . . is to indicate the need of meeting the issue directly by staying or dismiss-
ing pending actions whenever another forum is more appropriate." Foster, supra
note 22, at 1248.
NOTES
by the Supreme Court would seemingly resolve the problem. A plaus-
ible legal argument may be proposed which supports a requirement that
state courts entertaining FELA suits must hear a motion of forum non
conveniens. Uniform treatment of litigants in federal and state courts
has long been a strong influence upon the development of FELA law.29
Arguably, if 1404(a) permits transfer of inconvenient FELA suits in
federal courts, then uniformity requires that state courts also assert
the power to dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens. Cer-
tainly it is true, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter emphasized, that refusal
to permit use of the injunction achieves the opposite of uniform treat-
ment since venue is thereby absolute in all state courts except those
i-ecognizing the forum non conveniens doctrine. 30 Obviously, requiring
state courts to consider a motion for forum non conveniens would be
an alteration in procedure for most states, but this has not been an
insurmountable objection in the past development of FELA law.31 More-
over, compulsory adoption of the doctrine would place much less burden
on state courts than have other changes wrought by FELA, for forum
non conveniens would permit states to refuse to exercise jurisdiction.32
This is no small consideration since it is estimated that two-thirds of
all FELA suits are brought in state courts. 33 Other than the assertion
29. Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952) (Ohio
state courts must submit all factual issues under FELA to the jury regardless of
state procedure to the contrary). That Court said: ". . . [Olnly if federal law con-
trols can the federal Act be given that uniform application throughout the country
essential to effectuate its purposes." Id. at 361. Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338
U.S. 294 (1949) (a state court could not invoke local rules of pleading burdening
rights under FELA); Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22 (1923); C. & 0. Ry. v. Kelly,
241 U.S. 485 (1916) (state court's instructions on measure of damages invalid as
in conflict with federal court principles under FELA). See for a general discussion
and the suggested standard to determine when state procedural rules must give way
to federal rules in FELA, 27 IND. L. J. 536 (1952).
30. This deduction must be premised on the assumption that forumn non con-
veniens and the injunction subject venue to uniform equitable considerations. But
this is not a sound assumption, for the devices are two distinct remedies with inherent
differences requiring separate considerations even though the same end result may
be speciously reached. Use of the remedies interchangeably would not, when broadly
considered, achieve true uniformity in FELA venue. There is a considerable difference
in expense and convenience between deciding the propriety of venue in the same
court litigating the merits of the cause of action and a separate court in another state.
The injunction could be litigated again in substance by the distant court on the ques-
tion of recognition; if in addition, the injunction had been appealed in the enjoining
court several suits would be required before litigation on the merits. A decision on
forum non conveniens would be finally decided, even after review, in the courts of
one state with unconditioned effect. It cannot be reasonably denied that a large dis-
tinction with substantial effects exists between forum non conveniens and an injunction.
31. See note 29 supra.
32. See 46 ILL. L. K'v. 115, 126 n.51 (1951). While such a result would force
state courts to entertain dual procedures, the concurrent jurisdiction area is familiar
with such duality. See for a brief illustration with cases cited, id. at 127 n.54.
33. See 46 ILL. L. REv. 115, 128 n.58 (1951).
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of a doctrinaire states' rights position, therefore, little objection could
be made by defenders of local law.
Despite the superficial appeal of that argument, serious doubt
arises whether the question could be presented to the Court at all. If
the defendant in the Pope case had moved for dismissal by the Alabama
court on the basis of forum non conveniens, the motion would no doubt
have been denied and this result affirmed by the Alabama Supreme Court
in reliance upon local law. 34 Presumably the Mayfield case is substantial
authority for this position since Mr. Justice Frankfurter there stated
that a state court may refuse to accept a motion for forwom non con-
veniens on the grounds of local procedural rules or local policy.35 The
complete absence of any suggestion in Mayfield that a state must accept
the doctrine does not auger well for such a future contention. It does
not even appear that petitioner's counsel advanced this proposition. The
dissenters in the Mayfield case thought a federal question was involved
but only on the basis that the Missouri Supreme Court correctly con-
cluded that for the trial court to entertain the motion for forumn non
conveniens would violate the privileges and immunities clause.36 This
is, indeed, a far cry from a belief that the Missouri courts must enter-
tain the motion because federal law required it. Therefore, had the
Alabama court denied forum non conveniens expressly and solely on
considerations of state law, it is highly doubtful that the desiderata of
uniformity in the adjudication of FELA cases would be sufficient to
elevate the denial to the status of a federal question so that Supreme
Court review could be obtained.
Should such a case reach the Supreme Court the probability of a
compulsory inconvenient forum doctrine is also slight in view of the
restricted interpretation of 1404(a) enunciated by the Supreme Court
in the Pope case. Moreover, a judicial pronouncement imposing the
doctrine on state courts encounters serious policy objections. The major-
ity of state courts would suddenly be vested with an unfamiliar power
the use of which would be guided only by federal decisions on 1404(a)
and by foreign state decisions on forum non conveniens and injunc-
tions.. The relevant criteria by which to judge a vexatious suit are dis-
34. See note 17 supra.
35. The Supreme Court reviewed on the grounds that the state supreme court
felt bound by federal case law to deny forum non conveniens in FELA suits. The
majority decided, upon this basis, that the federal cases did not deny this power to
state courts and within constitutional limits as first enunciated in the Douglas case,
279 U.S. 377, forum non conveniens could be invoked.
For a brief discussion of the granting of certiorari in this case, see 46 kt. L.
REv. 115, 116 n.5, 6.
36. 340 U.S. 1, 6 (1950).
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persed with little uniformity among innumerably divergent fact situa-
tions.37 The opportunity for the railroads to take advantage of the new
problem presented to state courts should not be underestimated. If a
parallel may be drawn from other FELA problem areas, several years
would elapse before sufficient forum non conveniens cases were pre-
sented to the Court to enable it to elaborate a clear cut expression of
policy and of uniform considerations for trial courts to apply in ruling
on a motion to dismiss. 38 In the meantime the railroads could well afford
to appeal a refusal to dismiss as a warning to future litigants who may
choose an inconvenient forum. The result would be that the actual delay
and increased costs, or threat thereof, in defending an appeal of a refusal
to dismiss coupled with a lack of uniformity and specificity in enumerat-
ing grounds for finding the forum inconvenient, could lead the more
cautious attorney and litigant to refrain from choosing a forum which
possibly would be thought unsuitable to the railroad. Thus the inde-
cisiveness of a Supreme Court decision compelling states to use forum
non conveniens in FELA cases could conceivably be employed as a
weapon by defendant railroads. 39
In light of these considerations the sole significant result of the
Pope case is the emphatic notice it gives to Congress to amend Section 6
of FELA. Obviously, a satisfactory solution to the problem will not
be forthcoming from the courts. But, Congressional endeavors to limit
the scope of venue in an FELA suit must take cognizance of limitations
inherent in the basic purpose underlying the Act. The employee must
continue to be permitted easy access to state courts, yet Congress must
also prevent the possibility of an unjustified and inequitable burden upon
37. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 516 (1947), the dissent of Mr.
Justice Black expresses concern over the uncertainty which forum non conveniens
would place upon selecting a court: "The broad and indefinite discretion left to
federal courts to decide the question of convenience from the welter of factors which
are relevant to such a judgment, will inevitably produce a complex of close and
indistinguishable decisions from which accurate prediction of the proper forum will
become difficult, if not impossible." See Barrett, supra note 5, at 402.
38. See for example Alderman, What the New Suprenme Court Has Done to
the Old Law of Negligence, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 110 (1953). A chronological
study is made of Supreme Court decisions upon negligence principles in FELA litiga-
tion; the decisions have resulted in considerable confusion in lower courts.
39. "[C]ourts must take care to see that the effort to minimize hardship to the
defendant does not result in imposing new and unreasonable burdens on the plaintiff.
Delay, particularly in personal injury actions, favors the defendant." Barrett, supra
note 5, at 420, 421.
The dissenting opinion in the Mayfield case, 340 U.S. 1, 6, 7, takes cognizance
of the unfortunate delay of review of forum iwtn conveniens: "The cases out of
which this proceeding arises are now in their third year in the courts without coming
to trial, and remand by this Court will unnecessarily cause further delay and expense
in bringing them to final adjudication." Id. at 7.
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the employer. This suggests that a rigid, narrowly defined choice of
venue which neither permits easy access to the courts nor recognizes
the divergent individual needs would not be satisfactory. Illustrative
of this was a proposed amendment limiting venue in any tort action for
personal injuries or death against railroads to the place where the cause
of action arose or where the plaintiff resides.40  If process could not
be acquired against the railroad, then suit could be initiated where the de-
fendant was doing business. Such a narrow provision would, for
example, prevent an employee from suing in a state in which he was
hospitalized and in which his medical witnesses resided if he lived, and
the accident occurred, in another state.41 A plaintiff would be similarly
inhibited if available forums' dockets were so relatively crowded as to
cause unreasonable delay in litigating his claim-suit in another forum
would be impossible even though of great advantage to the employee
and not an inequitable and vexatious burden upon the defendant.42 An
appropriate venue section should be characterized by a flexibility which
does not so limit the employee's election of forums.
Careful consideration of these factors indicates that amending the
present venue section to condition the grant of state court jurisdiction
upon cognizance of a timely motion for forum non conveniens would
adequately alleviate the problem. Incorporating the doctrine as a sub-
stantive part of the FELA would assure the employee his choice of
forum but would provide a discretionary check on the propriety of suit
in a particular state court. 43 In order to adequately inform state courts
of the criteria by which forum non conveniens is to be measured, these
should be enumerated in the amended section. 44 Much of the objection
40. H. R. 1639, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
41. See Devitt, Venue of Actions, 34 A. B. A. J. 454 (1948). The article criti-
cizes limitation of FELA venue as suggested in H. R. 1639. It is pointed out that
many southern transcontinental railroads maintain hospitals as a service to injured
employees. These hospitals may be hundreds of miles from the scene of the accident
or where the injured employee resides. Since the employee's medical witnesses would
be in the district of the hospital, it would be an unjustified burden to require the
suit to be brought in the district of his residence or where the cause of action arose.
An FELA suit arose on substantially the same facts in Southern Pacific Co. v. Baum,
39 N.M. 22, 38 P.2d 1106 (1934). An injunction against the suit was denied.
42. See Devitt, supra note 41, at 530.
43. See 46 ILL. L. R-v. 115, 127 (1951).
44. In Kaufman, Observations on Transfers under Section 1404(a), 10 F.R.D.
595 (1951), the suggestion is made that specific criteria applicable in a ruling on
1404(a) should be codified in the statute. This would make for uniformity in federal
practice in applying the section and in reviewability of rulings pursuant to 1404(a).
If the section or its equivalent forum non conveniens should be invoked in an FELA
action in state courts, the same desire for uniformity and clarity should necessitate
an enumeration of criteria for invoking the doctrine.
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to judicially imposed forum non conveniens would then be avoided, and
both employers and employees would be assured of fairness in the opera-
tion of this particular phase of FELA.
CONSERVATION OF DWELLINGS: THE PREVENTION
OF BLIGHT
Nearly everyone is cognizant of firetrap tenements,1 overcrowded
and unsanitary boarding houses, and single-family dilapidated dwellings
with broken windows and crumbling foundations. Furthermore, most
people appreciate the efforts being made to rid our communities of these
malignant blotches. 2 Unfortunately, few persons are sufficiently aware
that the process of gradual deterioration creates such conditions, and con-
sequently a paucity of efforts are directed toward its prevention. 3
This deterioration process, which is labelled blight,4 is induced by
1. Occasionally, these conditions are brought vividly to the attention of the
citizen by the happening of a terrible disaster. This is exemplified by the recent
Chicago tenement fire which took 18 lives. See Chicago Daily Tribune, Sept. 12,
1953, § 1, p. 1, col. 9.
2. See footnote 20 and accompanying text infra.
3. Any program which is aimed entirely at the elimination of slums through an
attack upon the established slum area will only serve to force the slum into another
area.
"Like a migratory flock of black birds resting and feeding temporarily, so groups
of immigrants as well as individual families and isolated individuals stop in this
transitional area on their way up or down the social scale. Each of these waves of
people leaves a residue of poverty-stricken, socially unadjusted, maladjusted defectives
and delinquents which gradually accumulates into a slum population." WALKER,
URBAN BLIGHT AND SLUMS 31 (1938).
4. Many persons have attempted to define blight. See WALKER, op. cit. supra
note 3. In her discussion of blight, Dr. Walker cites the following definitions by
other writers: "A blighted residential area is one on the down grade, which has not
reached the slum stage." Wood, Slums and Blighted Areas in the United States,
1935 HoUSING Div. BULL. No. 1 at 3. "A blighted area is an area that economically
is not self-supporting." Analysis of a Slum Area in Cleveland 2, prepared for Cleve-
land Housing Authority. Blight exists in "' . . any area in which economic develop-
ment has been considerably retarded, as compared with the development in the larger
area, of which the area under consideration is a part." Knight, Blighted Areas and
Their Effect Upon Land Utilization, ANNALS OF THE AmERICAN ACADEMY 134 (1930).
Dr. Walker comes to the following conclusion: "At any rate the term 'blight' is used
in an economic sense, while the designation 'slum' is essentially of social significance....
A blighted area is generally unprofitable, but the opposite may be true of certain
slums. . . . For the purposes of this study we shall define blighted areas as those
sections of a community where, as a result of social, economic, or other conditions,
there is a marked discrepancy between the value placed upon the property by the
owner and its value for any uses to which it can be put, appropriate to public welfare,
under existing circumstances. This discrepancy prevents or handicaps the improve-
ment of the area. Old buildings are neglected and new ones are not erected and the
